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"The Garcetti Virus" and an erosion of whistleblower's rights

In Nancy M. Modesitt’s recent research article “The Garcetti Virus,” she explains how a doctrine known as the job duties exclusion has come to erode protections once afforded to whistleblowers. She explains that this doctrine allows the discharge of an individual who discovers illegal activities while performing his or her job and then reports those issues to a supervisor. Although one might think the current whistleblower laws would protect such disclosures, Modesitt explains that is no longer the case.
Modesitt details how the the Federal Circuit created the job duties exclusion more than a decade ago in the case of Wills v. Department of Agriculture (1998). The case involved an employee in the Department of Agriculture who reported to his supervisor that a number of farms he had investigated were not complying with a government soil-protection program. The supervisor disagreed with the employee’s findings and overruled him on 6 of the 7 cases. The employee complained about the decision and later claimed that he was retaliated against for his comments. When the case was heard by the Federal Circuit, the court decided that the employees comments did not put him “at personal risk for the benefit of the public good.” As such, the court ruled that his comments could not “constitute a protected disclosure under the [Whistleblowers Protection Act (WPA)].” In later cases involving disclosures made by federal employees, the courts further limited the protection afforded to them for their whistleblower activities.

As a result of these limitations, employees involved in investigation work who then report wrongdoing within their agency are currently only protected in two situations. Those situations are “(1) where the disclosure is made outside of normal reporting channels and (2) where the disclosure is not one that is normally a part of the job.” These protections are very limited in scope and encourage employees to report wrongdoing to outside sources instead of those within their agency. By limiting the protection of employees to cases where a issue was reported to an outside source, employees are encouraged to forgo reporting instances of wrongdoing to their supervisors and, instead, speak to outside sources. This can create a feeling of distrust between employers and employees that is not conducive to a healthy work environment.
Although the job duties exclusion was once only used in cases involving federal employees, Modesitt argues that a drastic change has occurred. An increasing number of employers have, with some success, argued that the exclusion should apply to employees in both the public and private sectors. To prevent the application of this exclusion to non-federal employees, Modesitt ends her article by offering two ways in which the issue can be handled. She states that Congress should amend the WPA to protect public and private sector employees and that state level legislatures should amend the whistleblower protection statutes in their own states. By employing these two solutions, she believes that whistleblowers will be able to, once again engage, in the “legitimate reporting of unlawful activity” without limitations that too severely constrict their speech.
This blog post was written by intern Russell Haver.

Other blog entries addressing Garcetti include:

Supreme Court ducks conflict on Garcetti

Ninth Circuit protects social worker's court testimony

ARB protects duty speech, but not investigating duties

DC federal court upholds jury verdict for fraud whistleblower

Federal Court Challenges Garcetti Policies in Baltimore Police Whistleblower Case

Garcetti defense hits a snag

Ninth Circuit protects social worker's court testimony

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion holding that a social worker is protected from retaliation for his courtroom testimony about  a former client. The case is Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health and Wilson, No. 09-35856 (9th Cir. 2011).

From 2005 to 2007, Sound Mental Health (SMH) of Seattle, Washington, employed Richard Clairmont as a domestic violence  program manager. He supervised a treatment program for offenders and members of the public.  SMH had a contract with the Seattle Municipal Court. In exchange for providing the services and making regular reports to the Court, the Court gave SMH office space and equipment. Joni Wilson was the Manager of Probation Services for the Court.

In 2007, a criminal defense attorney subpoenaed Clairmont to provide expert testimony in her client's case.  The client spoke Spanish, and had been terminated by a competing treatment program. Clairmont agreed to provide the testimony about the possibility that the client was treated differently because of the language issue. The Court's probation office was seeking a court determination that the client had violated the terms of probation such that the court should revoke probation and impose a jail sentence. When Wilson learned about Clairmont's testimony, Wilson called Clairmont's supervisor at SMH. Two weeks later, SMH fired Clairmont because of "critical feedback from the City of Seattle Domestic Violence Probation Officers Unit about your performance." The letter noted that "The program is in jeopardy. They have proposed a stop-referral beginning immediately. This leaves SMH with no option but to terminate your employment effective today.

The Ninth Circuit held that Clairmont could pursue a First Amendment claim because "his relationship to the Municipal Court was analogous to that of an employer and employee." A state agency cannot "abuse its position as employer to stifle the First Amendment rights its employees would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest." The Court held. The Court declined to hold that all court testimony is protected, but instead held that Clairmont's specific testimony here "helps the public evaluate the performance of public agencies."  That is enough to address a "matter of public concern." Sworn courtroom testimony will constitute speech on a matter of public concern when it “bring[s] to light potential or actual discrimination, corruption, or other wrongful conduct by government agencies or officials.”

In this case, it helped that Clairmont was addressing a matter of discrimination, civil rights violations, and threats to public safety. "[S]peech exposing policies that put people in jeopardy is inherently of interest to the public."

The Court rejected Wilson's claim that Clairmont was testifying as part of his official duties. If Wilson had been successful on this point, it could have required a dismissal of the case under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006). The Court said there was no evidence in the record that this testimony was part of his official duties. The Court also rejected Wilson's claim that qualified immunity should apply.  The Court found that the First Amendment right to testify in court about discrimination was well-established. The Court remained Clairmont's claims to the district court "for trial."

Congratulations to Richard Clairmont and his attorney, Jesse Wing of Seattle, Washington.

ARB protects duty speech, but not investigating duties

The Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board (ARB) has released eleven (11) decisions issued in July, four (4) of which address substantive law.  That is down from seven (7) substantive decisions issued in July 2009. At this rate, it will be difficult for the ARB to bring its backlog down below two years anytime soon.

In Vinnett v. Mitsubishi Power Systems, ARB No. 08-104, ALJ No. 2006-ERA-29 (ARB July 27, 2010), the ARB made clear that employees are protected when they perform their safety responsibilities too well. The ARB cited long-standing DOL precedent in holding that protected activity is still protected, even if it is part of the employee's normal job duties. William Vinnett began working for Mitsubishi Power Systems (MPS) in 2004 as a field project engineer. MPS assigned him to assess equipment vibrations at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant in Michigan. Vinnett reported a variety of concerns about technical errors, procedural violations and damage to a pressurized vessel.  He had to pester his supervisor to discuss these concerns. When he finally got his meeting, he received a warning letter about his performance. When he asked for another meeting a month later, he was fired.“The [Secretary’s] ruling simply forbids discrimination based on competent and aggressive inspection work. In other words, contractors regulated by [the ERA] may not discharge quality control inspectors because they do their jobs too well.”

Both OSHA and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled against Vinnett, who did not have a lawyer representing him. The ALJ said that since reporting his concerns was part of his job duties, his reports were not protected by the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA). The ARB disagreed. On p. 11, the ARB says, "there is nothing in the language of the ERA that carves out an exception limiting whistleblower protection based on an employee’s job duties. *** Nuclear safety is encouraged by protecting workers from retaliation because they report safety concerns." Quoting Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Sys., 735 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1984), the ARB adds, “The [Secretary’s] ruling simply forbids discrimination based on competent and aggressive inspection work. In other words, contractors regulated by [the ERA] may not discharge quality control inspectors because they do their jobs too well.” The ARB said that the ALJ had not cited any authority for denying protection to "duty speech." The ALJ could have cited the controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). In Garcetti though, the high court indicated that its ruling denying protection applied only to claims against government officials under the First Amendment, and it did not apply to rights under whistleblower protection laws. The ARB does not mention Garcetti in this decision.

On page 13, the ARB made some helpful observations about discovery.  It noted that Vinnett did not have an attorney, but did complain about not getting all the information he wanted from the company.  The ALJ denied him permission to make a motion to compel that discovery. The ARB asked the ALJ to reconsider that decision, or directly order the company to provide requested documents like the outage log, weekly reports, Vinnett's personal log, and not to just accept the employer's word about which parts were relevant. The ARB makes clear that complainants are entitled to a fair opportunity to compel discovery before an ALJ issues summary judgment.

In Bucalo v. United Parcel Service, ARB No. 08-087, ALJ No. 2006-TSC-2 (ARB July 30, 2010), the ARB affirmed a dismissal of Samuel Bucalo's complaint under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA). Bucalo has worked for UPS since 1979 in Sharonville, Ohio (near Cincinnati). He is also a union steward for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 100. In 2005, a coworker asked him to investigate a mercury spill. Bucalo testified that he was concerned about the safety of other employees (which would point to the weak protections of Section 11(c) of the OSHA Act, and not toward the environmental protections in TSCA). Bucalo found a UPS engineer who showed Bucalo how the affected area had been blocked off by caution tape. The next day, management suspended Bucalo and escorted him off the premises for creating a "chaotic situation." (What whistleblower complaint does not create a "chaotic situation" in the eyes of management?) UPS decided Bucalo should receive a one day suspension for this offense. Three days later, Bucalo performed an inspection of the premises when a UPS supervisor ordered him to leave.  Bucalo insisted he had a right to investigate, and an argument erupted before Bucalo finally left.  UPS fired Bucalo that day for failing to leave when first asked.

The ARB agreed with the ALJ that Bucalo's activities were on behalf of employee safety and not the environment, and are therefore not protected by TSCA. This holding fails to consider how employee safety activities can also touch on environmental safety. Moreover, it is the employer's statement of mind that makes retaliation unlawful, not the employee's. Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123-25 (3d Cir. 1987); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 85-CAA-1, SOL D&O at 13-14 (June 1, 1994) (holding that employer's mistaken belief about protected activity is sufficient to make retaliation unlawful). If UPS was afraid that Bucalo's investigation could lead to environmental enforcement activity, that should be sufficient to provide TSCA protection. The ARB held that UPS fired Bucalo for failing to follow the orders to leave, and not for protected activity. The "filed or about to be filed" language in the environmental laws also appears in the anti-retaliation prohibition of the False Claims Act, and in that context protects employees who are collecting information about possible fraud "before they have put all the pieces of the puzzle together." See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard University, 153 F.3d 731, 739-40 (D.C. Cir. 1998). ARB member Wayne Beyer, the only hold-over from the Bush administration, wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize that in his view, reporting a violation is protected, but not asking questions. He reached this conclusion without citing the Yesudian case. Bucalo did not have a lawyer for his DOL case.  Hopefully he will do better with labor-management arbitration. If other whistleblowers have claims arising from retaliation for asking questions, hopefully they will find this cite to the Yesudian case and ask the ARB to change this holding.

Ohio Governor and public servant disagree on the "typical whistleblower situation"

The governor of Ohio and an attorney working for Ohio's Bureau of Workers Compensation are disagreeing about what is a "typical whistleblower situation." According to the Columbus Dispatch, attorney Joseph Sommer sent an email to the Governor last May. He asked for an official state investigation of why a state panel had not complied with a state law requiring nominations for the Industrial Commission within sixty (60) days of a vacancy. Sommer used the state's email account to send his email. Instead of investigating the state's nominating panel, the state investigated Sommer for using his work email account.  The state has now issued a reprimand to Sommer for communication that was less than "professional." Sommer is contesting it.  The Governor's office says that Sommer's case, "differs from a typical whistle-blower situation." I don't know.  An employee points out how superior officials are breaking the law, and the boss blames the messenger.  That sounds pretty typical to me. The boss says that the whistleblower didn't use the proper means for raising the concern.  That sounds pretty typical, too. The boss punishes the whistleblower.  Typical again. Sommer may benefit from following the Supreme Court's consideration of City of Ontario v. Quon. The issue there is whether employees can have any expectation of privacy in using work equipment to communicate. Also, it is ironic to have a state claiming that the whistleblower communication was personal and didn't belong on the work computer. That argument could support Sommer if he were to claim that his email was made in his personal capacity and protected under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).

Federal Court Challenges Garcetti Policies in Baltimore Police Whistleblower Case

in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Garcetti v. Ceballos, in which they held that government employees are not protected by the First Amendment when they report concerns at work. This awful decision served as an impetus for advocates of employee rights, civil rights, and free speech issues, to band together and demand a comprehensive whistleblower law to protect government employees.  While advocates continue to battle for whistleblower rights in Congress, federal courts have begun to recognized the ill-conceived policies of the Garcetti decision. Recently, we told you about a 10th Circuit federal appeals court decision that allowed a building inspector whistleblower to have his day in court. Now, the 4th Circuit has produced a great decision in favor of a Baltimore policeman who reported misconduct in the police shooting of an unarmed elderly man.


As pointed out by this article, posted on The First Amendment Center website, Judge Wilkinson's concurring opinion in that case, Andrews v. Clark, is a powerful rebuke of the policies underlying the Garcetti decision. In his concurrence, Judge Wilkinson says that throwing out the whistleblower's case "would have profound adverse effects on accountability in government"  and “informed scrutiny of the workings of government...is impossible without some assistance from inside sources such as Michael Andrew.” This decision, along with Judge Wilkinson's concurrence, is great evidence that our federal judges get it.
 

I highly recommend reading the article, as well as the Andrews v. Clark decision.


 

Garcetti defense hits a snag

 When the United States Supreme Court issued the controversial 5-4 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), whistleblower advocates were rightly upset about the huge loophole the Court created for government officials who retaliate against whistleblowers.  The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not protect public employees when they are raising concerns as a part of their official duties.

A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, however, highlights a snag for government officials who are trying to escape liability:  how many employees really have an assigned job duty of blowing the whistle on their boss?  In Thomas v. City of Blanchard (Oklahoma), Case No. 07-6197 (December 3, 2008), the Court concluded that Ira Thomas was not acting pursuant to his duties as a building inspector when he threatened to report a fraudulent building certificate to the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI). Reporting crimes to OSBI was not a part of Thomas' regular duties; it was not what the City had "commissioned" him to do. "Merely because an employee’s speech was made at work and about work does not necessarily remove that employee’s speech from the ambit of constitutional protection."  The Court held that the mayor was not personally liable as there was no evidence that linked him to the decision to discharge Thomas.  The City, and two other officials involved in Thomas' termination, will now face a jury on Thomas' claims.

The Court's opinion is available at:

www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/07/07-6197.pdf